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Abstract
Political and social activists are rightfully concerned about future
generations: whenever a country borrows money, or an environmental
situation worsens, this means, in effect, that we impose an additional
burdens on future generations. There is clearly a conflict between the
present generation’s actions and interests and the welfare of the future generations. There exists a mathematical toolbox that provides
solutions to many well-defined conflict situations: namely, the toolbox
of game theory. It therefore seems reasonable to apply game theory
techniques to the conflict between the generations. In this paper, we
show that we need to be very cautious about this application, because
reasonable game theoretic techniques such as Nash bargaining solution
can lead to disastrous “solutions” such as universal poverty. In other
words, seemingly reasonable altruism can lead to solutions which are as
disastrous as extreme selfishness.
The development of appropriate techniques – techniques which would
lead to a reasonable resolution of this inter-generational conflict – thus
remains an important open problem.
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Inter-Generational Conflict: A Problem

When society makes large-scale long-term plans, the planners usually try their
best to take into account not only the interests of the current generation, but
also the interests of future generations. There is a justifiable worry that if
we spend too much of our resources (if we spend too much of the financial
reserves, if we deplete our fuel and/or environmental resources), we thus make
life more difficult for future generations.
Sometimes this difficulty is very clear: for example, when a country borrows
money, this simply means that the burden of paying off this debt is passed to
future generations. In general, there is often a conflict between the present
generation’s actions and interests and the welfare of future generations.
Journalists and politicians do an excellent job of attracting our attention to
this conflict, but attention is not enough: we need to develop reasonable quantitative techniques that would allow us to resolve this conflict when making
long-term large-scale decisions.
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Game Theory: A Well-Tested Approach to
Conflict Resolution

In real-life decision making, it is normal to have several participants with
different interests. In other words, it is reasonable to have conflicts. The
need to provide quantitative methods for resolving conflicts has been known
for almost a century. A whole toolbox of different techniques for resolving
such conflicts have been proposed and successfully used; these techniques are
collectively (and somewhat misleadingly) known as game theory; see, e.g., [1, 2].
Game theory originally started with conflicts in which the interests of different sides are exactly opposite (they are called “zero-sum games”), and evolved
into cooperative situations where all participants can benefit from collaboration.
One of the first solutions to cooperative conflict situations was proposed in
1950 by the (future Nobel prize winner) John F. Nash [3]. To derive a solution
– which is now known as the Nash bargaining solution – Nash proposed several
reasonable requirements and showed that the only alternative that satisfies all
these requirements is the alternative for which the product

N
Q
i=1

ui of the gains

u1 , . . . , uN of all the participants is the largest possible [1, 2, 3].
Let us therefore apply Nash bargaining solution to the inter-generational
conflict situation.
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Inter-Generational Conflict: A Formal Description

In order to apply Nash bargaining solution (or any other game-theoretic technique) to the problem of inter-generational conflict, let us describe this problem
in precise mathematical terms.
For simplicity, let us assume that we are talking about only one type of
resources. Under this simplifying assumption, at any moment of time, a single
number characterizes the current amount of available resources. This can be
money, this can be area covered by forests, this can be the amount of cattle.
In general, such resource, if unused, grows: money can be invested in a
bank, forests grow and expand, cattle multiplies. For simplicity, let us assume
that we have a fixed growth rate ε. So, if at present, we had r resources and
we do not use any of them, then by the time of the next generation, we will
have r · (1 + ε) resources.
In the beginning, at generation 0, we have a certain amount r0 of available
resources. Each generation can spend some of these resources and leave the
rest for the future generations. Let ri denote the amount of resources with
which the i-th generation starts, and let ki be the portion of these resources
that is used by this generation. In these terms, the gain of the i-th generation
is equal to ui = ki · ri .
The i-th generation spends the ki -th portion of the resources and leaves
the remaining amount ri · (1 − ki ) for the next generation. By the time these
remaining resources reach the next generation, they increase by a factor of
1 + ε, to the amount ri+1 = ri · (1 − ki ) · (1 + ε). What we need to decide is
how much resources should each generation spend, i.e., what are the values
k0 , . . . , k N .
Thus, we arrive at the following precisely formulated problem:
• We are given the number r0 > 0 and an integer N .
• For each selection of N + 1 real numbers k0 , k1 , . . . , kN ∈ [0, 1], we
sequentially define the values r1 , . . . , rN by using the formula ri+1 =
ri · (1 − ki ) · (1 + ε).

• The objective is to find the values k0 , . . . , kN for which the product
def

attains the largest possible value, where ui = ki · ri .

N
Q
i=0

ui
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Inter-Generational Conflict: Nash Solution
to the Formalized Problem

Let us show how to solve this optimization problem. For that, let us first find
an explicit expression for ri in terms of r0 and the coefficients k0 , k1 , . . ..
For i = 1, we have r1 = r0 · (1 − k0 ) · (1 + ε). Similarly, for i = 2, we have
r2 = r1 · (1 − k1 ) · (1 + ε). Substituting the above expression for r1 in terms of
r0 , we conclude that
r2 = (r0 · (1 − k0 ) · (1 + ε)) · (1 − k1 ) · (1 + ε) = r0 · (1 − k0 ) · (1 − k1 ) · (1 + ε)2 .
By induction over i, we can prove that, in general,
ri = r0 · (1 − k0 ) · (1 − k1 ) · . . . · (1 − ki−1 ) · (1 + ε)i .
Thus, we have
ui = ki · ri = ki · r0 · (1 − k0 ) · (1 − k1 ) · . . . · (1 − ki−1 ) · (1 + ε)i .
N
def Q

We are interested in the largest possible value of the product p =

i=1

ui over

all possible values ki ∈ [0, 1]. This largest possible value cannot be attained
for ki = 0 or ki = 1 (for i < N ). Indeed:
• If ki = 0, then ui = ki · ri = 0 and thus,

N
Q
i=1

ui = 0.

• If k1 = 1, then ri+1 = ri ·(1−ki )·(1+ε) = 0 and thus, ui+1 = ki+1 ·ri+1 = 0
and also

N
Q
i=1

ui = 0.

So, the maximum is attained for ki ∈ (0, 1) and thus, at the point where the
∂p
= 0.
maximum is attained, we have
∂ki
Substituting the above expressions for ui into the formula for the product,
we conclude that for each parameter ki , the product p contains several factors
depending on ki :
• the factor ki in the term ui , and
• the factor (1 − ki ) in each of the following terms ui+1 , . . . , uN (there are
N − i such terms).
Thus, with respect to ki (i < N ), the product p has the form
p = const · ki · (1 − ki )N −i ,
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where const denotes the product of all the factors that do not depend on ki .
For i = N , the product is simply proportional to kN and thus, its largest
value is attained when the value kN ∈ [0, 1] is the largest possible – i.e., when
kN = 1.
For i < N , as we have mentioned earlier, the maximum of the product p is
attained when ki ∈ (0, 1), i.e., when the derivative with respect to ki is equal
to 0. Differentiating the above expression with respect to ki and equating the
derivative to 0, we conclude that
(1 − ki )N −i − ki · (N − i) · (1 − ki )N −i−1 = 0.
Dividing both sides by (1 − ki )N −i−1 , we get
1 − ki − (N − i) · ki = 0,
i.e., that (N + 1 − i) · ki = 1 and
ki =

1
.
N +1−i

In particular:
• for i = 0, we have k0 =

1
;
N +1

• for i = 1, we have k1 =

1
, etc.
N

It is worth mentioning that for i = N , this general formula leads to the optimal
value kN = 1 – and is thus applicable for all i = 0, . . . , N .
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Discussion and Open Problem

In the intended application to an inter-generational conflict, N is the number
of generations that we take into account. The larger N we take, the better.
Ideally, we should consider as many generations as possible, i.e., we should
consider N → ∞.
1
→ 0 and thus,
However, in the limit N → ∞, we have ki =
N +1−i
ui = ki · ri → 0. Thus, in the seemingly optimal solution, when we take care
of the interests of future generations, we end up with a worst-possible scenario
where each generation lives in poverty (or at least does not benefit at all from
the analyzed resource).
In other words, seemingly reasonable altruism can lead to solutions which
are as disastrous as extreme selfishness.
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The development of appropriate techniques – techniques which would lead
to a reasonable resolution of this inter-generational conflict – thus remains an
important open problem.
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